








Welfare reforms and labour  















WORKING PAPER 2009:29 
 
 The Institute for Labour Market Policy Evaluation (IFAU) is a research institute under 
the Swedish Ministry of Employment, situated in Uppsala. IFAU’s objective is to 
promote, support and carry out scientific evaluations. The assignment includes: the 
effects of labour market policies, studies of the functioning of the labour market, the 
labour market effects of educational policies and the labour market effects of social 
insurance policies. IFAU shall also disseminate its results so that they become acces-
sible to different interested parties in Sweden and abroad. 
 
IFAU also provides funding for research projects within its areas of interest. The 
deadline for applications is October 1 each year. Since the researchers at IFAU are 
mainly economists, researchers from other disciplines are encouraged to apply for 
funding. 
 
IFAU is run by a Director-General. The institute has a scientific council, consisting of a 
chairman, the Director-General and five other members. Among other things, the 
scientific council proposes a decision for the allocation of research grants. A reference 
group including representatives for employer organizations and trade unions, as well as 
the ministries and authorities concerned is also connected to the institute. 
 
Postal address: P.O. Box 513, 751 20 Uppsala 
Visiting address: Kyrkogårdsgatan 6, Uppsala 
Phone: +46 18 471 70 70 





Papers published in the Working Paper Series should, according to the IFAU policy, 
have been discussed at seminars held at IFAU and at least one other academic forum, 
and have been read by one external and one internal referee. They need not, however, 
have undergone the standard scrutiny for publication in a scientific journal. The purpose 











This paper looks at welfare reforms in Italy and their effects on labour supply. I focus 
on social security reforms, which have taken place in the 1990s and on labour market 
reforms. Old age social security expenditure in Italy is high (14% of GDP) and the sys-
tem has been very generous on early retirement possibilities: the reforms have tried to 
tackle these issues with mixed results. The labour market reforms have addressed the ri-
gidity of the labour market by making it easier for firms to hire on a short-term basis. 
However the UI system is limited to open-ended contracts and coverage is also re-
stricted, so that young workers employed in short-term contracts have very little protec-
tion from the welfare state.  
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2  IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy 1  Introduction 
Italy has seen a flurry of reforms in the 1990s, but these have been limited to social se-
curity and some segments of the labour market. The Italian welfare system is characte-
rized by an overwhelming weight of old age spending if compared with other OECD 
countries, in contrast unemployment benefits and family protection provisions play a 
minor role. In Italy old age spending reached 11.6% of GDP in 2005 and is now ap-
proximately 14%; unemployment spending is only 0.5% and other social areas are basi-
cally at zero expenditure in the year 2005.  Public spending on old-age and survivors’ 
benefits in Italy have been the highest amongst OECD countries for some time: 
pensions take nearly 30% of the budget, compared with an OECD average of 16%. 
Hence the first part of this paper is devoted to the social security system and its reforms. 
I look at the composition of income by sources drawn from the Survey of Household 
Income and Wealth of the Bank of Italy to show that disability benefits and unemploy-
ment benefits play a minor role in comparison to old age benefits (particularly at older 
ages). I then describe the social security reforms and their impact on labour supply, 
mainly via the age-eligibility restriction to early retirement. The important reform of 
1995, which changed the system into a Notional Defined Contribution NDC method of 
calculation of benefits has a very long transitional period which has made it essentially 
ineffective so far.  
In order to describe the typical labour market welfare provisions I first describe the 
reforms of the labour market, which was well known for its rigidity (the employment 
protection legislation EPL index, produced by the OECD, was very high until recently). 
These reforms (taking place in 1997 and 2003) have reduced youth unemployment rates 
by opening the possibilities to access short-term jobs. However these short-term jobs are 
then hardly transformed into open-ended contracts (a two-tiers labour market) and also 
they lack welfare coverage. I describe the UI system and its evolution by highlighting 
the fact that coverage is mostly restricted to open-ended contracts under special condi-
tions. 
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In terms of income support the Italian system is characterized by an overwhelming 
weight of old age spending if compared with other OECD countries and in particular 
with European countries, in contrast unemployment benefits and family protection pro-
visions play a minor role. Table 2.1 shows the composition of welfare spending for se-
lected countries as percentage of GDP. Italy was scoring high on old age spending al-
ready in 1995, but in 2005 old age spending increased to reach 11.6%  ranking second 
after Austria (and social security expenditures are predicted to increase to 15% in the 
next few years)
1; unemployment spending is only 0.5% and other social areas are basi-
cally at zero expenditure in the year 2005. OECD data for the year 2009 confirm that It-
aly is the highest ranking country in terms of public old age spending. 








Year  1995  2005  1995  2005  1995  2005  1995  2005  1995  2005 
Country                         
Austria  12,3  12,6  2,8  2,4 0,4 0,6 1,3 1,1  5,9  6,8
France  10,6  10,9  2,1  1,9 1,2 0,9 1,6 1,7  7,5  7,8
Germany  10,4  11,2  1,9  1,9 1,2 1 1,7 1,7  8,2  7,7
Greece  9,2  10,8  0,8  0,9 0,4 0,1 0,4 0,4  4,5  5,6
Ireland  2,9  2,9  1,5  1,6 1,3 0,6 1,8 0,9  4,8  6,5
Italy  9,4  11,6  1,8  1,7 0,3 0,6 0,7 0,5  5,1  6,8
Netherlands  5,5  5,5  5  3,6 1,4 1,3 2,8 1,5  5,9  6
Spain  8,3  7,9  2,5  2,5 0,4 0,8 3,2 2,2  5,4  5,8
Sweden  9,8  9,6  5  5,6 2,2 1,3 2,3 1,2  6,2  6,8
United 
States  5,4  5,3  1,2  1,3 0,2 0,1 0,3 0,3  6,1  7
 
Hence, it is clear that public old age spending crowds out other social expenditures, 
both in social policy (on benefits for children or unemployment) and elsewhere (on edu-
cation, for example).  Revenues from pension contributions in Italy are also very high 
amongst OECD countries: contribution rates are 32% of gross earnings, compared with 
                                                 
1 Ragioneria Generale dello Stato, (2009) Relazione Unificata sull’Economia  e sulla Finanza Pubblica RUEF 
4  IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy an OECD average of 21%. Nevertheless the social security budget runs a deficit which 
is covered by taxation at large. 
The same conclusion can be drawn looking at the composition of income sources by 
age-groups and year. The only data-base which allows me to have a complete account 
of the income sources for individuals at different ages is the Survey of Households In-
come and Wealth (SHIW) produced by the Bank of Italy. Fully comparable definitions 
are available from 1989 to 2006. I focus on two age groups (50-54 and 55-59) where 






























Type of income received by year, age 50-54
 
Figure 2.1 Composition of incomes received; age 50–54
2 
                                                 
2 Retired includes all individuals collecting an old age or early retirement benefits, plus survivor benefits and other 
non contributor benefits.. 



























Type of income received by year, age 55-59
 
Figure 2.2 Composition of incomes received; age 55–59 
At young ages (40–49) very few individuals benefit from unemployment insurance 
or other provisions. As age increases, the relevance of social security benefits is domi-
nating the scene. In particular as many as 18% of individuals in the age group 50-54 and  
40% in the age group 55-59 collect retirement benefits (Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2). 
Starting in 1995, disability benefits and survivor benefits as well as old age benefits de-
crease for both age groups. This is partly due to the effect of the reforms of the 1990s, 
as I will explain later. It should be noted that the large expenditure on disability in the 
early years is explained by the existing stock of disability benefits granted before the 
1990s, which is gradually reduced by an important disability-insurance reform in 1984 
which gradually reduced the take-up.
3. 
Activity-inactivity rates are drawn both from the Labour Force Survey and from the 
SHIW Survey. While the former is designed to record labour force status, and available 
for a long time span, it should be noted that it has two major problems: (1) until recently 
it was recording only employed and unemployed; (2) there are several breaks in the se-
ries, particularly relevant is the one in 1993, with a change in definition of the unem-
                                                 
3 For the age group 60-64 old age benefits and survivor benefits (collected mostly by  widows)  become dominant 
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4. Hence the SHIW data can provide more information on 
the non-employed and more comparability over time, but it has a limited time-span. 
First it is useful to look at employment rates – separately for men and women – in re-
cent years (Table 2.2). Employment rates are much higher for men than women, they 
hardly reach 50% for the age group 20–24 (mostly due to schooling) and in the age 
groups 55-59 and over (due to retirement and early retirement). 
 
Table 2.2 Employment Rates in 2004–2008 by age-groups and gender 
Men 
Age  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
15-19 12.0  10.8  10.7  9.8  9.3 
20-24  48.5 47.3 49.1 48.5 48.5 
25-29  73.9 72.7 74.0 73.4 73.2 
30-34  87.1 86.4 86.5 87.2 86.2 
35-39  90.8 90.6 90.9 90.9 90.1 
40-44  92.1 91.8 91.8 91.3 90.2 
45-49  90.9 90.7 91.2 90.8 90.6 
50-54  82.7 85.2 86.7 87.7 87.2 
55-59  54.0 55.5 56.4 59.0 60.3 
60-64  29.1 27.6 28.0 28.9 29.1 
65-69  10.8 11.6 12.3 12.0 12.5 
70-74  5.5 5.1 5.2 5.6 5.6 
Women 
Age  2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
15-19  6.8 5.3 4.9 5.2 4.9 
20-24  37.5 34.7 34.0 33.0 33.1 
25-29  55.1 53.6 55.7 55.1 55.4 
30-34  61.7 62.0 62.0 62.2 63.0 
35-39  61.5 61.6 62.9 63.0 63.3 
40-44  60.6 61.0 61.8 61.5 62.2 
45-49  57.2 57.6 59.1 59.9 60.1 
50-54  48.4 49.1 51.9 53.6 55.2 
55-59  29.5 31.1 32.0 33.8 35.4 
60-64 9.1  9.1  9.8  10.6  11.6 
65-69  2.9 2.8 2.9 3.1 3.2 
70-74  1.1 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.3 
Source: Labour Force Survey 
 
                                                 
4 The Italian Statistical Office has provided harmonized data drawn from the Labour Force Survey from 1977 to 2003 
(MARSS data). 
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forms, it is important to look at patterns of the employment rates for distinct age groups: 
particularly relevant are the age groups from 50 to 64. Figure 2.3 shows that the 
employment rates have been steadily declining with an important reversal taking place 
after 1995, particularly for the age group 50-54, due to the pension reforms of 1992 and 
1995, when the more stringent rules on early retirement start binding (as I will explain 
later). Similar evidence is drawn from the Bank of Italy data SHIW (Figure A.1 and 
Figure A.2 in the Appendix) which also show the relationship between inactivity (re-





























1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Empl age 50-54 Empl age 55-59
Empl age 60-64 Empl age 50-54 (LFS)
Empl age 55-59 (LFS) Empl age 60-64 (LFS)
Employment rate old age
 
Source: Labour Force Survey
5 
Figure 2.3 Employment time for the age groups 50–54,55–59 and 60–64 
Figure 2.4 shows that while the employment rate of prime age individuals (25–64) is 
rather stable with an increase after 1996, the employment rate of young people (20–24) 
has been steadily declining due to increased schooling with an important reversal in the 
trend after 1997, the time when labour reforms took place. 
                                                 
5 In 2004 there is an important change in the survey methodology of the Labour Force Survey, which explains the 
break in the series   

























1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010
Year
Empl young Empl prime age
Empl young (ISTAT) Empl prime age (ISTAT)
Employment rate prime age and youth
 
Figure 2.4 Employment time for the young (20–24) and prime age (25–64) 
Source: MARSS, Labour Force Survey 
Recent years (2007, 2008) have witnessed an increasing gap between the employ-
ment rates of these age groups.  
Unemployment of the young is a serious concern in Italy, I will therefore describe 
some facts specific to unemployment. The Italian unemployment rate reached its peak 
in the second half of the 1990s. Recent years saw a downward trend such that Italy is no 
longer amongst the highest unemployment countries (see Table 2.3).  
Table 2.3 Harmonized unemployed rates for selected OECD countries. Source: OECD 
2009 
 Country  Year 
   1980  1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2008 
Austria ..  .. .. 3.9 3.6 5.2  3.9
France 5.8  9.6 8.4 11 9 9.3  7.9
Germany ..  .. .. 8 7.5 10.6  7.3
Greece ..  7 6.3 9 11.2 9.9  7.7
Ireland ..  16.8 13.4 12.3 4.4 4.4  6
Italy 4.8  8.2 8.9 11.2 10.1 7.7  6.8
Netherlands 4.3  7.9 5.9 6.6 2.8 4.7  2.8
Spain 9  17.8 13 18.4 11.1 9.2  11.4
Sweden 2.1  2.9 1.7 8.8 5.6 7.3  6.1
United States 7.1  7.2 5.6 5.6 4 5.1  5.8
Euro area ..  .. .. 10.4 8.5 9  7.6
OECD - Europe ..  .. 8 9.8 8.2 9  7.1
OECD - Total ..  .. 6.1 7.3 6.2 6.8  6
 
Figure 2.5 shows the total unemployment rate for the period 1977–2008. In order to 
provide an explanation for the observed patterns, it will be necessary to split the data by 
IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy  9 gender and geographical region. However, long time series on disaggregated unem-
ployment rates in Italy are not readily available, since official statistics feature various 
definitional changes making it very hard to reconstruct regional employment rates by 
age and gender. Time series of unemployment reconstructed by the Italian Statistical 
Office on a consistent basis using the Labour Force Survey data (MARSS) are available 




































(Source: Labour Force Survey-) 
Figure 2.5 Total unemployment rate (all ages) 
At the aggregate national level, including all ages from 15 to 70, two main “humps” 
are observed – one at the end of the 1980s and another in the second half of the 1990s. 
The reversal observed after 2000 is partly due to an important reform of the labour mar-
ket of 1997 (known as the “Treu Package”). Unemployment starts to increase again in 
2008. When looking at the data in more detail, it should be noted that for the younger 
age groups and older age groups unemployment does not follow exactly the non-em-
ployment patterns (Figure A.3 and Figure A.4 in the Appendix) due to the inactivity sta-
tus of “student” or “retired”, hence it is useful to inspect the unemployment data for 
these age groups
6. When focusing on the disaggregated unemployment figures (Figure 
2.6 and Figure 2.7) it is striking that there is a wide dispersion across regions and by 
                                                 
6 Obviously the difference between the two series is also partly due to the fact that the unemployment rates are 
defined as the people unemployed over the labour force. 
10  IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy gender: more than 60% of women in the labour force in the age group 20-24 in the 


















1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Unem North Unem Center
Unem South & Islands
Italy 1977-2003, Age group 20-24
Women Unemployment rate
 
(Source: Labour Force Survey) 


















1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Unem North Unem Center
Unem South & Islands
Italy 1977-2003, Age group 20-24
Men Unemployment rate
 
(Source: Labour Force Survey) 
Figure 2.7 Unemployment rate for men by year and region, age 20–24 
These patterns show that the Italian labour market is particularly unbalanced and it 
has often been characterized as having “insider/outsider” features.  At one extreme, 
standard open-ended contracts are extremely protected as firing costs are particularly 
high. At the other extreme, fixed-term contracts have become quite popular in the last 
                                                 
7 As explained in the text employment and unemployment data are hard to obtain on a consistent basis because of the 
many changes in the methodology. The regional unemployment data made available stops in 2003.  
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welfare protection and hardly any transition is observed from fixed-term contracts to 
open-ended contracts, as I shall discuss later. 
3  Recent reforms in Italy 
In this section I describe the main features of the welfare system and the important re-
forms by focusing the attention on the social security system and the unemployment in-
surance system. 
3.1  Social security 
Because the basic historical aspects of the system are well documented elsewhere (see 
Brugiavini, 1999 and Brugiavini and Peracchi, 2004), in this paper I describe very 
briefly its main rules and recent developments (see also OECD, 2007). 
3.1.1  Main features of the Italian social security system  
The Italian social security system is based on a variety of institutions administering 
public pension programs for different types of workers (private-sector employees, pub-
lic-sector employees, self-employed, professional workers)
8.  All programs are of the 
unfunded pay-as-you go (PAYG) type.  Despite a process towards convergence during 
the 1990s, the various programs maintain quite different rules. In terms of pillars, the 
first “public” pillar is the most relevant as the following Table 3.1 shows in comparison 
to Spain and the USA. 
                                                 
8 Social security system and pension system are in this paper used as synonymous. In fact, social security is the main 
source of publicly provided income in old age in Italy. 
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Table 3.1 Composition of retirement income in selected countries 
 Italy  Spain  US
First Pillar 
b  74% 92% 45%
Second Pillar 
d  1% 4%  13%
Third Pillar 
f  25% 4%    42% 
g
Notes: The rows (summing to 100%) show the composition of retirement income according to sources. (b) Public re-
tirement income (public pensions, social assistance, civil servants‘ pensions, etc.) as percent of total income of two-
person retiree household. (d) Private occupational pension income as percent of total income of two-person retiree 
household All other retirement income (asset income, net transfers received, earnings, etc.) as percent of total income 
of two-person retiree household. (g) 25 percentage points of this figure are earnings. 
Source: Brugiavini, Peracchi and Wise, 2003. 
 
Currently, about two thirds of the labour force is insured with the National Social 
Security Institute (INPS).  The Institute is responsible for a number of separate funds, of 
which the most important covers the private-sector non-agricultural employees (Fondo 
Pensioni Lavoratori Dipendenti or FPLD). Social security collects contributions from 
employers and employees and covers three types of risks: longevity risks (old age bene-
fits), the risk of death (survivor benefits) and disability risks (disability benefits).  
The system started before World War I but was re-designed in 1969:  social security 
benefits changed from a defined-contribution social insurance system to an earnings-
related social insurance system. The idea was to guarantee to every worker a retirement 
income comparable to what earned during the working life. At the same time coverage 
increased.  
An early retirement pension was introduced (called seniority pension) related to the 
years of contribution (irrespective of age), to guarantee a pension income also to indi-
viduals with at least 35 years of contribution. The idea was to provide income to people 
who had started to work early and also to women, who had carried out both market and 
non-market activities during their lifetime. It should be noted that the early retirement 
option was made available to private sector employees but also to particular categories 
of public sector employees. 
With the same legislative act, the social pension was introduced to guarantee a basic 
standard of leaving also to all citizens who had no other incomes. It consists of a 
monthly payment to individuals who are not eligible for an old age pension, who are 
aged 65 or older and hold an Italian citizenship. 
IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy  13 These reforms took place at a time when the economy was growing and there was no 
concern for the old age crisis and the longevity improvements that undermined the sys-
tem in the late 1980’s. The way benefits were computed changed over time, but was es-
sentially of a “final salary” type as averages of the earnings of the last years of work 
formed the basis for the calculation (called pensionable earnings). To these averages 
some “rate of return” (representing the accrual factor) was applied: a parameter ap-
proximately equal to 2%, for each year of contribution
9. An upper limit was placed on 
the pensionable earnings, which was however removed in 1988 and earnings exceeding 
the limit would be taken into account in the benefit calculations, but not at their full 
amount.  Until 1968 old-age pension and earnings could not be combined, this restric-
tion was lifted in 1969 but within limits.  
In 1969 it was also established that pension benefits should be indexed according to 
an automatic growth mechanism that linked benefit to both inflation and part of the 
wage growth. In 1976 benefits were automatically indexed to the contractual wages of 
the workers in the industrial sector. 
The statutory retirement age for old age benefits was 60 for men and 55 for women, 
however, as anticipated, a generous early retirement option was available that allowed 
workers to retire at any age if 35 years of contributions had been completed.  
The social security system guarantees an old age pension, a seniority pension and a 
disability pension
10 to public sector employee since 1919 through a large variety of 
small funds. In 1973 all these funds were merged into one. Benefits calculations were 
even more generous than in the private sector as the average earnings immediately prior 
to retirement formed the basis of the benefit. 
Following the same requirements of the pensions for the private employee, the 
pension of the public sector employee has a floor (minimum benefit) and a ceiling to 
                                                 
9 The rate was initially lower and grew over time 
10 In Italy, disability pension refers to more than one type of pension. In 1919, a public invalidity pension, was 
introduced; it was available for individuals with a physical or mental disease, certified by medical checks, that cause 
a reduction of at least 2/3 of the original working capacity. With Law no. 222 of June 12, 1984, the public inability 
pension was introduced for private employees only; it is available for individuals with a physical or mental disease, 
certified by medical checks, which is permanent and makes it impossible to carry out any job. With the Dini reform 
of 1995, the public inability pension was extended also to public employees under the proviso that the impairments 
are not caused by work. In 1995 a special inability pension for the public sector already existed, which provides for 
income support in the case where the impairments are caused by work (see the section on disability) 
14  IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy pensionable earnings. In the public sector men and women could retire through early 
retirement even with just 20 or 15 years of contributions, respectively, at any age.  
3.1.2  Reforms of the social security system in the 1990s 
As I argued, in the early stages up to 1980’s governments showed no concern for the 
generosity of the social security system and the growth in pension outlays. Indeed re-
forms, in the form of “parametric changes”, almost invariably increased generosity of 
the system (see also Boeri, Brugiavini and Peracchi 2003 and Brugiavini and Galasso, 
2004). The main reforms of the social security system took place in 1992, 1995 and 
1997.  They are known, respectively, as the Amato, Dini and Prodi reforms, from the 
names of the Prime Ministers at the time.  In addition, smaller changes to the system 
have been made nearly every year since 1992.  Of the three main reforms of the 1990s, 
the Dini reform appears as the most radical, because it completely redesigns the system 
by modifying the eligibility rules and by changing the benefit formula from defined-
benefits to defined-contributions (notionally defined contributions). However, because 
the changes are only introduced gradually, through a very long transitional period, the 
direct effects of the Dini reform may be considered small compared to the less radical 
Amato reform.  
Overall, because of the long transitional periods, the cohorts that reached the retire-
ment age during the 1990s and those currently retiring remained largely unaffected by 
the reforms of the 1990s, as most of the burden of the adjustment fell on the younger 
cohorts (Brugiavini and Galasso, 2004).   
More precisely, the 1992 (Amato) reform explicitly distinguishes between workers 
with at least 15 years of contributions at the end of 1992 and all other workers.  The old 
system (introduced in 1969) applies, with some changes, to the former, whereas the new 
system only applies to the latter. The new rules of the Amato reform established that  
the age requirement for an old-age pension was to be gradually increased by one year of 
age every two years, starting from 1994, until reaching age 65 for men and age 60 for 
women in the year 2000. 
Also from 1994, the requirement is set at age 65 for state employees (irrespective of 
gender) and age 60 for local government employees (again, irrespective of gender). The 
old requirements remain unchanged for a few special categories (army and police per-
IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy  15 sonnel, flight personnel, travelling personnel of public transportation services, firemen 
and employees of the entertainment industry).  
The numbers of years of contribution required for an old-age pension is gradually in-
creased by one every two years starting from 1993, until reaching 20 years of contribu-
tions in 2001.  
For workers with less than 15 years of contributions at the end of 1992, the reference 
period for computing pensionable earnings is gradually increased until including the 
whole working life, with past wages adjusted to inflation on the basis of the annual rate 
of change of the cost-of-living index plus an additional 1%. 
One important change, aimed at curtailing the generosity of pension benefits, is that 
benefits are automatically adjusted, on an annual basis, only to the changes in the cost 
of living and not to real wage growth. 
The adoption of different rules for older and younger workers is maintained in the 
subsequent 1995 (Dini) and 1997 (Prodi) reforms.  In particular, with the exception of 
the new eligibility rules, very few changes apply to workers with 18 or more years of 
contributions at the end of 1995, beyond those already introduced in 1992.  Hence con-
ditions both for eligibility and for benefit calculation vary according to three categories 
of covered workers: 
•  Category A. New entrants to the labour force as of 1996.  
•  Category B. Insured workers with less than 18 years of contributions in 1996.  
•  Category C. Insured persons with at least 18 years of contributions in1996.  
The Dini reform changed dramatically the pension system of younger generations, 
that moved from a defined benefit calculation method to a notionally defined contribu-
tion method (very similar to the Swedish system). The drawback is that this reform had 
a very long transitional period (the first generation to retire fully under the new regime 
will be in 2032). In the transitional phase benefits would be calculated on a pro rata ba-
sis according to the number of years of contributions under the two regimes (contribu-
tions paid after 1993 count under the new regime).  
The Dini reform introduced other important changes. The payroll tax rate was in-
creases from 27% to 32% for all dependent employees in the private sector. Two thirds 
of the payroll tax rate had to be covered by the employer, the residual part paid by the 
16  IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy employee. Also for public sector employees one part of the contribution would be paid 
by the State. Since 1996 the percentage of contributions of the employee is equal to 
8.75% and the percentage of the State is 24.20%. 
One major change is that, during the transitional phase,  in order for workers to be-
come eligible for seniority pension, a joint requirement of age and years of contribution 
was introduced: starting from 1996 a worker could retire if he was aged 52 and had ac-
cumulated 35 years of contribution. These limits were raised gradually such that in 2002 
the entry age was 57 with 35 years of contribution, for both men and women (similar, 
though slightly different rules applied to public sector employees). The minimum age 
requirements for seniority pensions were in any case gradually increased to reach age 40 
in 2008. Table 3.2 summarizes the situation for the three major social security funds. 
Under the new regime (depending on the number of years of collected contributions)  
workers, both men and women,  who started working after 1995 (workers in Category 
A) can choose the age of retirement in a range between 57 and 65, with a minimum re-
quirement of at least 5 years of contribution. 
By far the major change of the 1995 reform is in the benefits computation method as 
a notionally defined contribution (NDC) system was adopted based on accumulated 
contributions, applying to workers who started their career after 1995 (Category A). For 
a worker who started paying contribution on or after January 1, 1996, the pension is 
based on a notional annual contribution, equal to 33% of annually covered earnings in 
the case of employees and equal to 20% of annually covered earnings for the self-em-
ployed. Notional contributions are adjusted annually according to the average rate of in-
crease in gross domestic product (GDP) during the last 5 years.  At retirement, the life-
time accrued notional stock of contributions is multiplied by an actuarial coefficient that 
varies according to the worker’s age (from 4.720% at age 57 to 6.136% at age 65). 
The “pro-quota” system I mentioned applies also to the benefit calculation for work-
ers with less than 18 years of contributions at the end of 1995 (Category B). Hence the 
actual benefit calculation also varies according to time of entering the labour market. 
As far as collecting benefits while working, the new rules established that it would be 
possible to combine benefits with earned income, subject to some limitations. 
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employees (INPS), public sector employees (INPDAP) and the self-employed. 
Year   INPS (Private 
Sector)  












Only years of   
contribution  
Self-employed 
 Age and years 
of contribution 
Self –employed
Only years of   
contribution  
1998   54 and 35  36  53 and 35  36  57 and 35  40 
1999   55 and 35  37  53 and 35  37  57 and 35  40 
2000   55 and 35  37  54 and 35  37  57 and 35  40 
2001   56 and 35  37  55 and 35  37  58 and 35  40 
2002   57 and 35  37  55 and 35  37  58 and 35  40 
2003   57 and 35  37  56 and 35  37  58 and 35  40 
2004   57 and 35  38  57 and 35  38  58 and 35  40 
2005   57 and 35  38  57 and 35  38  58 and 35  40 
2006   57 and 35  39  57 and 35  39  58 and 35  40 
2007   57 and 35  39  57 and 35  39  58 and 35  40 
2008   57 and 35  40  57 and 35  40  58 and 35  40 
   
 
A mini-reform was implemented in 2007 introducing changes for new entrants to the 
labour force and to the seniority (early retirement) pension. Starting in 2008, workers 
who started their career after 1995 will be eligible to old-age pension at age 65 (men) 
and age 60 (women) with at least 5 years of paid contributions or any age if 40 years of 
contributions have been collected. Hence the seniority pension was extended to those 
entering the labour force in 1996. At the same time rules were tightened for those cur-
rently claiming early retirement: in 2008 and 2009 the joint requirement for retirement 
is age 58 with at least 35 years of contributions; regardless of age with at least 40 years 
of contributions. From July 1, 2009, eligibility depends on an index (called “quota”) 
which is the sum of the workers’ age and the years of collected contributions (35 years 
of contributions are always the minimum requirement). Hence the “quota” in 2009 is 
95.  
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under the new regime; i.e., for workers entering the labour market after 1996. However, 
retirees with total incomes below the social-assistance level can claim a means-tested 
social benefit from age 65. 
3.2  Disability  
The social security system envisages two types of disability provision: 
1  Ordinary (“civilian”) disability benefit granted to all citizens under certain health 
impairments. 
Since 1970 it grants to deaf or dumb people older than 18, a disability benefit and in 
some cases also a monthly attendance supplement; after 1980 this benefit is no longer 
transferred to survivors. For people older than 65 years a non-contributory pension is 
paid (pension sociale). 
2  Disability (called invalidity) benefit for workers 
A person registered with INPS (paying contributions) whose working capacity is 
permanently reduced because of physical or mental impairment of at least 2/3.  
The important landmark is a law passed in 1984 for private sector employees, public 
sector employees and the self-employed establishing that the invalidity pension is 
granted if a physical or mental disease is certified by a medical test and it causes a re-
duction of at least 2/3 of the original working capacity. Furthermore at least five years 
of social security contributions are necessary, of which at least three years paid during 
the five years before the application, at least five years of enrolment in the INPS list 
overall. The important restriction introduced in 1984 is that the invalidity pension is not 
a permanent pension (it should be renewed every three years, after three times it will 
become a permanent pension). It will become an old age pension at the legal retirement 
age. It is incompatible with unemployment benefits. The legislation of 1984 applied to 
private sector employees; it was extended to public sector employees in 1995. 
In 2000, it was established that all employees are eligible for INAIL life annuity  
which is applicable  for any work injury which causes a permanent invalidity between 
16% and 100%. 
A further benefit envisaged for workers is the “inability pension”:  this is granted to 
workers registered with INPS (or entitled to the public invalidity pension) whose physi-
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tire life (i.e. people who lost 100% of their working capacity) 
3.3  Social assistance for the elderly and poverty relief 
In 1952 it was established that benefits not reaching a minimum level would be topped 
up, the difference being paid by the State through general taxation. One peculiar feature 
of the Italian social security system is that retirees can draw more than one benefit (for 
example early retirement benefit and invalidity benefit). Up to 1983 this topping up 
would apply to any benefit, but since 1983 this was possible for only one pension per 
retiree. This topping up is means-tested, taking as a reference income also the income of 
the spouse. The minimum monthly benefit currently is € 443.12 for a single pensioner
11 
or for a couple with annual income less than € 17,281.68  
Survivors are entitled to benefits if the deceased was an insured worker (at least 5 
years of contributions). Eligible survivors are: the spouse, also if separated and entitled 
to alimony; children younger than age 18 (age 21 if in full-time education, age 26 if a 
university student, no limit if disabled at the time of the insured’s death) and other rela-
tives in decreasing order. The survivor pension is determined as a percentage of the 
wage or old age pension collected by the deceased: 60% to the spouse; 20% to each 
child, if the spouse is entitled too, or 40% if only the children are entitled.  
The Dini Reform of 1995 also changed the requirements for survivor benefits. Survi-
vors can claim a benefit if the deceased had at least 15 years of contributions, or if he 
had reached the requirements for a disability pension (i.e. 5 years of contributions, in-
cluding 3 in the last 5 years before death). The Dini Reform also changed the percen-
tages for benefits: 60% to the spouse without children; 20% to each child, if the spouse 
is entitled too; 70% to orphans; 40% to each child if single parent; 15% to each parent, 
brother and sister. 
A specific social assistance provision earmarked to alleviate poverty in old age is the 
“social pension”. This benefit is granted to the elderly, aged 65 and over, who are Italian 
citizens and not eligible for the old age pension. Social pensions are paid by the State 
and are means-tested: in 2008 the annual benefit for a single pensioner with income less 
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than twice the amount of the social pension is € 10,285.34. 
While the 1969 pension reform introduced a social pension for over 65 year-olds 
without other pension entitlements and sufficient income it did not tackle poverty at 
large. During the 1970s regional governments assumed responsibility for poverty relief, 
since 1977 private and church-affiliated charities were no longer in charge of the ad-
ministration of these benefits. However, regional governments were expected to act on 
their own initiative in the absence of a centrally regulated framework. Thus, a geo-
graphically highly differentiated system of welfare assistance evolved over the years 
(Picot, 2009; Fargion, 1996). 
It should be added that in Italy there is not a general minimum income scheme, apart 
from a recent attempt (the so called reddito minimo di inserimento -- RMI), initially 
tested in 1998 in very few municipalities, then extended in 2001 to a still limited area, 
and eventually terminated by the Parliament.  
With regard to family benefits, the most important ones – the “assegni per il nucleo 
familiare” (family allowances) – are means tested and restricted to employees (or bene-
fit recipients, including pensioners and unemployed covered by unemployment insur-
ance schemes). There are also universal family benefits, such as the maternity allowance 
and the allowance for households with at least three children – introduced in 1998 and 
reinforced in 2001; these benefits are means-tested through an income and wealth 
measure known as the Indicator of Economic Situation of the household (ISE) intro-
duced in 1998 as a general instrument to evaluate social benefit eligibility. 
3.4  Contracts and labour market regulations 
3.4.1  Main features of the labour market and its regulation 
The Italian labour market has long been characterized by a lack of flexibility; however 
there have been some recent changes, as documented below. 
The Italian institutional setting in terms of labour contracts is based on the 1970 La-
bor code. The code is focused on the protection of the open-ended employment contract, 
                                                                                                                                               
11 This benefit is means tested, it increases after age 70.  
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stringent regulation on temporary employment relationships limiting them to seasonal 
or unusual activities (or top management), and restricting their renewal (with the re-
quirement that it should be turned into an open-ended employment contract). In 1977 a 
law allowed temporary employment for retail and tourism industries, and in 1983 all 
sectors were allowed to hire on a temporary basis in case of peaks in demand. In 1984 
“Contratti di Formazione e Lavoro” were made possible for young workers (aged 16 to 
32), which had a fixed duration (1.5 to 48 months, depending on age and qualifications) 
and entailed a payroll tax cut for the firm. These contracts were meant to have some 
training content and to provide a stepping stone to permanent employment, but in prac-
tice made temporary hires much easier for employers. 
Hence, over time, a variety of limited duration contracts (‘atypical employment ar-
rangements’) were introduced in Italy: 
•  fixed-term contracts (employees), in which a limited duration is possible because of 
specific circumstances due to the type of work or to the worker status. For example 
jobs with limited duration duties or workers deemed as disadvantaged by the law; 
•  training contracts, i.e. apprenticeship and other training-related youth contracts that, 
at least in principle, should have some training content but do not guarantee a per-
manent position at the end of the training period. 
•  CO CO CO., a contract, which is legally framed as self-employment, but very often 
has the attribute of dependent employment. Indeed, “CO.CO.CO.” (Collaborazione 
Coordinata e Continuativa) workers include a variety of professional figures, from 
qualified professionals to de facto dependent workers. Up to 1997 these workers 
were not even required to pay social security contributions (they are still not eligible 
for maternity leaves, unemployment insurance, and paid vacation). There are no 
official statistics on the number of CO.CO.CO, but administrative sources estimated 
more than 2 million contracts only in the year 2000. 
3.4.2  Recent reforms in the labour market 
Employment pacts have been an essential component of Italy's policy environment in 
the 1990s. The Protocol of July 1993, and Patto del lavoro (Work Pact) of September 
1996 were important milestones in Italy’s path towards EMU. Both were explicitly 
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the basis of a low target inflation rate, the latter introducing important elements of labor 
market flexibility. 
These pacts stipulate a number of education and training-related measures on the part 
of the Government, as well as a redesign of fiscal and contributory schemes aimed at 
reducing labor costs. In exchange, Unions agree to index contractual wage profiles to 
planned inflation rates (with only partial ex-post recouping of lost purchasing power). 
This provision played a crucial role in allowing entry in EMU. 
The important steps, taking place since 1997, of the reform process can be summa-
rized as follows (Boeri and Garibaldi, 2007).  
1997: “Treu Package” is enacted. It stipulates a reduction of the drastic sanctions in 
case of violation of the fixed-term contracts discipline (conversion of fixed-term con-
tract into an open-ended one) and the  legalisation of temporary work agencies. Atypical 
labour contracts are encouraged by reducing social security contributions and pension 
provisions and by removing automatic transformations of fixed term contracts into 
open-ended ones. The package eases regulation of new apprenticeship and work-train-
ing contracts and sets incentives for on-the-job training (stages). The “Treu Package” 
represents a landmark: the law, initially aimed at offering flexible labour supply in re-
sponse to temporary shocks, turned out to be particular popular among Italian firms, 
which exploited it not only as a short run buffer, but also as a gateway toward more 
permanent employment. At the end of 1992, 7.1 per cent of the employees were on 
temporary contracts. By the end of 2003 this share had risen to 10.3 per cent. 
2001: By means of a Decree-Law, the EU Directive 1999/70/EC on fixed-term work 
is implemented through a joint statement with the unions. The new legislation removes 
the explicit list of the specific circumstances in which the use of fixed-term employment 
is legal. The law made it possible to hire workers on a temporary basis (provided the 
reasons are clearly stated in the contract), and the standard open-ended contracts were 
no longer regarded as the default employment relationship. 
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(staff-leasing) job sharing, supplementary work, “lavoro a progetto – Co.Co.Pro.”, 
which slightly tightened the regime for the already existing Co.Co.Co. 
Alongside increased flexibility towards temporary and part-time contracts, other im-
portant legislative changes allowed various “special contracts” to be implemented. 
These changes made the Italian labor market flexible “at the margin”, with a reform 
process similar to that observed in Spain and in France. According to the OECD (see 
OECD, 2004) the Employment Protection Legislation Index (EPL) has fallen remarka-
bly in Italy
12. This can be seen in Figure 3.1 which shows on the left panel the index in 
1990 (X-axis) and in 2003 (Y-axis) for fixed-term contracts, while on the right panel it 
shows the same change in the index for temporary contracts. In both cases the index 
suggests increased flexibility, but temporary contracts are the ones with a comparatively 
higher drop in the index.   
 
                                                 
12 EPL index is based on a number of characteristics of the market and it goes from 1 (most flexible) to 5 (least 
flexible) 
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Figure 3.1 Employment protection legislation, 1990–2003 
3.5  Unemployment insurance  
The Italian unemployment benefit system is a complex one; across the various schemes, 
there are substantial variation in eligibility conditions, compensation levels, and dura-
tion of benefit receipt. It provides income to workers who (involuntarily) lost their job. 
Currently, one can distinguish between “comprehensive unemployment insurance” and 
“partial insurance”. The latter is also regarded as a wage supplementation fund; most 
importantly, individuals collecting partial insurance known as Cassa Integrazione Gua-
dagni CIGo (ordinary) or CIGs (special) are not formally recorded as unemployed as 
they are not laid off.  
1  Comprehensive insurance (UI) 
•  Ordinary unemployment benefit 
•  Special unemployment benefit 
•  Mobility benefits 
2  Partial Insurance 
•  Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Ordinaria (CIGo) 
•  Cassa Integrazione Guadagni Straordinaria (CIGs) 
IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy  25 The ordinary unemployment benefit (UI) can, in principle, be claimed by all em-
ployees. Special unemployment benefits are specific of some sectors such as construc-
tion workers. Mobility benefits can be claimed by all employees (apart from construc-
tion workers) who  have previously benefited from CIGs; hence it is a follow up to 
CIGs insurance. The CIG can be claimed by workers in specific sectors which are un-
dergoing a business cycle crisis situation or are under restructuring. Contributions are 
paid by workers and employers at differential rates (in the industrial sector 4.71% of 
gross wage, of which 4.41% falls on the employer;  in trade and commerce 2.51% of 
gross wage, of which 2.21% on the employer). The government finances the fund with 
discretionary annual contributions. 
3.5.1  Eligibility, benefit duration and benefit levels 
a) UI – Ordinary and special unemployment benefits are paid to workers laid off in 
the private sector, who are not eligible for other benefits and have paid contributions for 
at least 52 weeks during the two-year period preceding unemployment
13. Some benefits 
may also be claimed by those who have worked at least 78 days over the last year (re-
duced requirement). Special, and more favourable, conditions apply to workers in the 
agricultural and the construction sector (10 monthly benefits are required in the last 2 
years before the unemployment spell).  
Ordinary unemployment benefits are paid on a 7-day week basis, for a maximum of 
180 days (extended to 8 months since January 2008). For unemployed aged over 50, the 
duration has recently been extended to twelve months (from the previous 9). In the case 
of reduced requirements, duration is equal to the number of days previously worked. 
Different durations hold for workers in the agricultural and in the construction sector. 
Furthermore the benefit is stopped if the beneficiary gets a new job or he refuses a job 
similar to the one he lost or if he does not accept to be employed in a socially useful job. 
Benefits are paid as a percentage of average wages over the last 3 months with a ceiling 
imposed. For the ordinary UI benefits, the replacement rate is initially 60% (for the first 
6 months, 50% for the 7th and 8
th month, and 40% for the subsequent months)  
                                                 
13 Excluding young workers in vocational training 
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wage supplementation funds, respectively). Ordinary benefits are paid to workers for 
foregone hours of work (also at zero hours) due to a temporary reduction or a suspen-
sion of the activity. Special benefits are paid when the suspension of the activity is not 
temporary, but is due to sector - or area - specific firm restructuring. Workers of small 
manufacturing firms (below 15 employees) and of most service activities are excluded 
from CIG. A large number of firms fall under the special case CIGs, one example is air 
carriers. Workers on these schemes have (at least formally) an on-going work relation-
ship, as their contracts have not been terminated; hence they do not enter the unem-
ployed records. 
CIGo is normally paid for a maximum of 13 weeks and, only under special circums-
tances, up to 52 weeks. The replacement rate is 80% of the wages foregone. There are 
ceilings (in 2009 € 886 monthly for wages below € 1917 and 1065 for wages above). 
CIGs (special CIG) is normally paid for 12 to 24 months (the length depending on 
the type of difficulties that the firm faces as well as on the restructuring strategy). There 
is a possibility to obtain some extension if restructuring lasts more than 24 months. In 
any case, CIGs cannot be paid for more than 36 months over 5 years. 
c) Mobility benefits (mobility list) are provided in case of collective dismissals to 
workers who have been fired by firms eligible for benefit from the CIGs and in case of 
individual dismissal of workers already in CIGs or under bankruptcy procedure. In other 
words, mobility benefits insure workers in the period which goes from dismissal from a 
job which provided partial insurance (CIGs) to a new job or retirement. The worker can 
collect this benefit if he was employed with the eligible firm for the last 12 months, at 
least 6 months of which actually working
14. The worker would be granted 100% of the 
former CIG benefit for the first year and 80% of that benefit afterwards up to the CIGo 
ceiling. The ceilings in 2009 are € 886 monthly for workers whole total compensation is 
below € 1.917 gross per month; € 1.065 monthly for workers whose monthly total com-
pensation is above that limit. 
                                                 
14 Recall that workers in CIGo or CIGs are not formally laid off. 
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cation of the job.  For instance, workers under 40 are entitled to this benefit for 12 or 24 
months, respectively, according to whether they had been working in the Centre-North 
or in Southern Italy.  
Table 3.3 Duration of mobility benefits by age of the worker and geographical location 
 
 
Conversely, the benefit duration is extended up to 36 or 48 months respectively for 
workers over 50. This possibility to pay longer durations to older unemployed was 
meant to limit the use of early retirement or pre-retirement
15 
3.5.2  Unemployment Insurance – Stylized facts and the reforms 
During the 1970s, a number of gradual changes occurred to CIG, in terms of coverage 
and in terms of replacement rates. For example, CIG which has been in place for the 
construction sector since the beginning, was extended to artisan firms in 1970 and to the 
mining sector in 1971. In 1972, an additional CIG scheme for the agricultural sector 
was set up (CIGA), initially with somewhat less generous conditions. However, in 1975 
the replacement rate for all CIG schemes was fixed at 80%. Another significant move in 
1972 made it possible to extend the duration of the CIGs potentially indefinitely. Fur-
thermore, in 1977 the applicability of the scheme was extended to “corporate crises with 
a particular social relevance”, hence making the use of CIG widespread. Later, coverage 
of CIGs was extended to the trade sector firms with more than 200 dependent workers 
and the CIGO to white-collar workers. Clearly, with these steps the transformation of 
this program into a de facto unemployment benefit was completed: it became a me-
chanism for firms to shed labour without formally dismissing workers. However it 
                                                 
15 Pre-retirement schemes were widely used during the 1980’s to lay off older workers in special industrial sectors. 
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cluding construction) with more than 15 employees.  
In contrast to these marked expansions in CIG, only small changes occurred with re-
spect to UI. The benefit level of UI was raised from a daily amount of 400 Italian lira to 
800 Italian lira (effective in 1975). This made the net replacement rate rise from 10% to 
15%. But over the next 14 years, the flat rate benefit was not changed at all, leading to a 
continuous loss in real terms.  
By the end of the 1970s, Italy had a highly fragmented system of unemployment 
compensation, in which three broad strands can be distinguished (Sestito and Viviano 
2008): first, a very generous scheme in the industrial sector including mainly CIGs in-
surance, but also of other CIG schemes; second, ordinary UI, which paid low benefits, 
but had wide coverage; third, unemployment insurance for the agricultural sector, that 
follows different rules than the general scheme and had the character of income support.  
Between the 1970s and the 1980s there was a reduction of CIGs benefits and the in-
troduction of a benefit ceiling for CIGs payments. At first this maximum amount was 
set at a level slightly higher than 80% of the gross wage of an average production 
worker. Therefore it did not immediately have strong effects on the living standard of 
most CIGs beneficiaries. However, it was established that this benefit ceiling should be 
increased yearly by 80% of the real growth in wages (scala mobile), hence the ceiling 
would become binding over time. Indeed a significant decline of the net replacement 
rate for the average production worker over the 1980s occurred. 
The benefit for ordinary UI had remained at the lump-sum amount of 800 lira per day 
for a long time. During the 1980s, the benefit was converted to a nominal replacement 
rate that was initially set at 7.5% of the previous wage. In subsequent years, the benefit 
level was increased several times. In the last three of these reforms (in 2000, 2005, and 
2007) in addition to raising the nominal replacement rate also the maximum durations 
of UI were increased, differentially by age.  Particularly important is the change legis-
lated in 2000 – enacted in 2001— which increased the ordinary UI from 30% to 40% of 
the wage (see Figure 3.2) and prolonged benefit duration for people over 50 to 9 
months.  
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Figure 3.2 Evolution of replacement rates of ordinary UI 
 
In sum, the 20 years between 1987 and 2007 have seen significant moves to reduce 
the segmentation of unemployment benefits in Italy. The benefit level of UI has been 
raised from a negligible lump sum to a net replacement rate of about 60% while the ge-
nerosity of CIG has gradually been reduced.  
3.6  Income taxation 
It is very hard to describe the Italian tax system because this is characterized by a large 
number of tax rates (as many as 32 in the old days) attached to different income brack-
ets, by tax deductions related to the type of job (say dependent employment) and de-
ductions or tax credits related to family composition.  The tax unit is the individual, un-
less spouses do not explicitly indicate that they intend to file a joint income-tax form. 
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Table 3.4 Marginal tax rates by income brackets 
 
    Income brackets (in Euro) and tax rates (in %) 
year     1   2  3  4  5  6  7 
1989  Upper bound  3098 .74  6197 .48 15493 .71 30987 .41 77468 .53  154937 .07  >154937.07
   Tax rate  10 .00%  22 .00% 26 .00% 33 .00% 40 .00%  45 .00%  50 .00%
1990  Upper bound  3305 .32  6559 .00 16423 .33 32898 .30 82168 .29  164388 .23  >164388.23
   Tax rate  10 .00%  22 .00% 26 .00% 33 .00% 40 .00%  45 .00%  50 .00%
1991  Upper bound  3511 .91  6972 .17 17404 .60 34912 .49 87177 .92  174407 .49  >174407.49
   Tax rate  10 .00%  22 .00% 26 .00% 33 .00% 40 .00%  45 .00%  50 .00%
1992  Upper bound  3718 .49  7436 .98 15493 .71 30987 .41 77468 .53  154937 .07  >154937.07
   Tax rate  10 .00%  22 .00% 26 .00% 33 .00% 40 .00%  45 .00%  50 .00%
1993  Upper bound  3718 .49  7436 .98 15493 .71 30987 .41 77468 .53  154937 .07  >154937.07
   Tax rate  10 .00%  22 .00% 26 .00% 33 .00% 40 .00%  45 .00%  50 .00%
1994  Upper bound  3718 .49  7436 .98 15493 .71 30987 .41 77468 .53  154937 .07  >154937.07
   Tax rate  10 .00%  22 .00% 26 .00% 33 .00% 40 .00%  45 .00%  50 .00%
1995  Upper bound  3718 .49  7436 .98 15493 .71 30987 .41 77468 .53  154937 .07  >154937.07
   Tax rate  10 .00%  22 .00% 26 .00% 33 .00% 40 .00%  45 .00%  50 .00%
1996  Upper bound  3718 .49  7436 .98 15493 .71 30987 .41 77468 .53  154937 .07  >154937.07
   Tax rate  10 .00%  22 .00% 26 .00% 33 .00% 40 .00%  45 .00%  50 .00%
1997  Upper bound  3718 .49  7436 .98 15493 .71 30987 .41 77468 .53  154937 .07  >154937.07
   Tax rate  10 .00%  22 .00% 26 .00% 33 .00% 40 .00%  45 .00%  50 .00%
1998  Upper bound  7746 .85  15493 .71 30987 .41 69721 .68 >69721.68       
   Tax rate  18 .50%  26 .50% 33 .50% 39 .50% 45 .50%       
1999  Upper bound  10329 .14  15493 .71 30987 .41 69721 .68 >69721.68       
   Tax rate  18 .50%  26 .50% 33 .50% 39 .50% 45 .50%       
2000  Upper bound  10329 .14  15493 .71 30987 .41 69721 .68 >69721.68       
   Tax rate  18 .50%  25 .50% 33 .50% 39 .50% 45 .50%       
2001  Upper bound  10329 .14  15493 .71 30987 .41 69721 .68 >69721.68       
   Tax rate  18 .00%  24 .00% 32 .00% 39 .00% 45 .00%       
2002  Upper bound  10329 .14  15493 .71 30987 .41 69721 .68 >69721.68       
   Tax rate  18 .00%  24 .00% 32 .00% 39 .00% 45 .00%       
2003  Upper bound  15000 .00  29000 .00 32600 .00 70000 .00 >70000.00       
   Tax rate  23 .00%  29 .00% 31 .00% 39 .00% 45 .00%       
2004  Upper bound  15000 .00  29000 .00 32600 .00 70000 .00 >70000.00       
   Tax rate  23 .00%  29 .00% 31 .00% 39 .00% 45 .00%       
2005  Upper bound  26000 .00  33500 .00 100000 .00 >100000.00         
   Tax rate  23 .00%  33 .00% 39 .00% 43 .00%         
2006  Upper bound  26000 .00  33500 .00 100000 .00 >100000.00         
   Tax rate  23 .00%  33 .00% 39 .00% 43 .00%         
2007  Upper bound  15000 .00  28000 .00 55000 .00 75000 .00 >75000.00       
   Tax rate  23 .00%  27 .00% 38 .00% 41 .00% 43 .00%       
 
Table 3.4 shows the marginal tax rates attached to each income bracket since 1989. 
For each year the first row is the upper bound of the relevant income bracket (in Euro) 
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number of marginal tax rates and the compression of income brackets taking place over 
time: the general tendency has been to reduce the tax burden. However, there exist no 
simple estimate of how the average tax rate has evolved over time in Italy; hence one 
should be careful in concluding that income taxes have actually gone down over time. 
Tax deductions have been applied differentially in order to protect the lower income 
families. Before 2003, tax credits and deductions were totally determined by labour 
market status (differentially for employees, self-employed and retired) and by family 
composition (dependent spouse and children). In 2003 a “tax exempt income level” was 
introduced and deductions were applied in a progressive fashion. Hence for example tax 
deductions are a flat 3000 Euro for each worker, plus (according to the time spent in 
work) 4500 Euro for an employee, 4000 Euros for a retiree and 1500 for a self-em-
ployed. However, the resulting tax deduction (7500 Euro, 7000 Euro and  4500 Euro re-
spectively) is applied in full (i.e. it becomes a tax exemption level)
16 only if the income 
of the tax-payer falls within specified limits (obtained through a complicated computa-
tion), otherwise it decreases with the income level to reach zero for an income level 
above 33000 Euro. 
Tax credits are also related to the income level, for example for an employee, they 
range in a non-linear fashion, from 130 Euros for incomes between 27000 Euros and 
29500 Euros, to reach 25 Euros for incomes between 46000 Euros and 52000 Euros. Fi-
nally tax credits apply for: (i) dependent spouse (varying over time and according to in-
come, currently reaching a maximum of 800 Euros) and (ii) each child in the range of 
285 Euros (one child, higher incomes) to 516 Euros (second child, third child etc.).  
4  The effects of the reforms 
4.1  Effects of social security reforms 
As I argued, the effects of social security legislation have been very relevant throughout 
the 1980s and 1990s. The reforms of 1992 and 1995 have been evaluated indirectly in a 
                                                 
16 In the 2007 Budget the tax exempt income level has been raised to 8000 (employee), 7000 (retiree) and so on….. 
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2007). Figure 2.3 indicates that the reforms had an effect, since there was a reversal of 
the trend out of the labour force for individuals aged 50–54 and 55–59, primarily be-
cause of the restrictions imposed on early retirement. However a proper evaluation of 
the reforms and more generally of the trends requires some summary measure of the in-
centives and a proper identification strategy. One can measure incentives by calculating 
the “implicit tax on work” that an extra year of work induces. The implicit tax is the re-
sult of a simulation procedure and it measures the loss that an individual bears by 
working an extra-year in terms of paying more contributions and foregoing benefits 
(Gruber and Wise, 1999; Brugiavini, Peracchi and Wise, 2003). 
Table 4.1 Replacement rates and Implicit tax rates on work before the year 2000 
 
Last year 


















54 …  0  … … …  0 
55 0,726 0,245  … 0,201 … -0,022 
56 0,744 0,308  … 0,096 … 0,046 
57 0,761 0,338  … 0,152 … 0,060 
58 0,780 0,372  … 0,355 … 0,069 
59 0,798 0,401  0,590 0,279  …  0,072 
60 0,799 0,697  0,661 -0,074  …  0,071 
61 0,804 0,711  0,730 0,010 0,403 0,064 
62 0,805 0,718  0,816 0,032 0,440 -0,028 
63 0,805 0,729  0,895 0,167 0,476 -0,005 
64 0,809 0,746  0,996 0,264 0,703 0,031 
65 0,809 0,756  0,998 0,729 0,749 0,188 
66 0,809 0,772  0,996 0,725 0,798 0,225 
67 0,809 0,787  0,988 0,718 0,845 0,269 
68 0,809 0,803  0,981 0,677 0,872 0,439 
69 0,809 0,818  0,973 0,636 0,898 0,455 
 
 
Table 4.1 clearly shows that Italy, before the reforms of the 1990s, had a very high 
replacement rate and a high tax on work even at young ages, hence inducing early re-
tirement.  
In order to capture the effects of changes in legislation, particularly the ones due to 
pension reforms, Brugiavini and Peracchi (2007) contrast several measures of incentives 
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centives measures: this way the incentive variable will embed, in each year, legislation 
changes in the social security system (i.e. benefit calculation and eligibility rules) and at 
the same time avoiding the endogeneity problems contaminating actual social security 
data series. In order to carry out this simulation they make use of the Bank of Italy Sur-
vey (Survey of Household Income and Wealth-SHIW) containing detailed information 
on several characteristics of individuals in Italy. 
Before turning to the simulation methodology the authors look at a simple measure 
capturing changes in eligibility rules: this is the sum of minimum age requirements and 
number of years of seniority necessary to apply for an early retirement benefit. In fact 
workers could retire in Italy either with a sufficiently high age (the legal retirement age 
for old age benefits which is now 65 for men) or with a given number of years of con-
tributions (for example any age if 40 years of contributions have been completed) or a 
combination of the two (for example 57 years of age and 35 years of contributions). 
This latter variable is called “quota”
17: before 1995 this was equal to 60 because one 
could retire with 20 years of contributions at “any age”, for example age 40, it then 
grew suddenly in 1995 to reach level 83 and increased gradually thereafter. Figure 4.2 
shows the relationship between the employment rate of the old and the variable quota. 
The trend in the “quota” indicator anticipates of a few years the rise in employment of 
the old group.  However the “quota” variable is a rather rough measure of the complex 
financial incentives of the social security system: we construct incentives which capture 
different dynamic features of the social security system.  
                                                 
17 See also Section 3.1.2. 









































Figure 4.1 Italy: Trends in the employment rate of the old and the “quota” indicator 
To compute the simulated benefits, the authors start from the profile of median 
earnings of a given cohort and focus on cohorts born before the Second World War, in 
particular individuals born in 1938 and 1939 and carry out the estimate the benefit sepa-
rately for men and women and by employment type (private-employee, public-em-
ployee and self-employed)
18. They smooth the earnings profiles by means of age 
polynomials and also by non parametric smoothers. The same real earnings profile is 
then imputed (taking account of the relevant job-gender group) to members of that 
group. Productivity growth of the different cohorts is taken into account by shifting the 
age-earnings profile. 
Simulated benefits are then obtained according to the prevailing legislation for each 
employment type, taking account also of eligibility rules. For example, they model the 
Amato reform (implemented in 1993) as changes affecting both currently retired people 
(trough reduced indexation – based on inflation only) and future retirees through 
changes in the benefit calculation, eligibility rules, and indexation of future benefits (see 
Brugiavini and Peracchi, 2004 for details). Hence, the effects on current variables, such 
as disposable social security benefits, are immediately captured after 1992, both because 
                                                 
18 In the SHIW sample one has variation with respect to all individual characteristics and can also distinguish whether 
the pension benefit originates from a private sector occupation, public sector occupation or from self-employment 
(“employment types” or simply “jobs”) 
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ing the transitional period.  
As discussed in Section 2, there were a number of changes to the benefit computation 
rules; however, eligibility rules were almost unchanged until the 1992 reform. Also the 
existence of a generous early retirement option allowed retirees to have plenty of flex-
ibility on the timing of retirement, so that the introductions of more restrictive eligibility 
rules of the 1990’s had little impact in the current cohorts of retirees. The effects of the 
minimum age requirements are relevant after 1995, especially for individuals in the age 
range 50-55  
One key variable to compute incentives is the social security wealth, this is a sum-
mary measure of all the characteristics of the system as experienced by one individual. 
For a worker of age a, we define social security wealth (SSW) in case of retirement at 
age h ≥ a as the expected present value of future pension benefits from time “h” on-
ward.  It depends on the flow of future benefits, the discount factor and longevity. 
The pattern of SSW is generally hump-shaped over age, i.e. there is a peak value 
reached at some eligible age and SSW declines thereafter. Changes in the benefit com-
putation rules occurring after 1992 explain why retirees who claim early retirement 
would have low benefits due to lower average “pensionable earnings”, despite the fact 
that there is no actuarial penalty on early retirement in Italy. 
Figure 4.2 shows the change in social security wealth due to the Dini reform (once 
fully phased in). A typical (median earner) worker would have his pension wealth re-
duced almost by half if he retired between ages 50 and 59 comparing the entitlements he 
would benefit from in the pre-1992 regime and the post 1995-regime (once fully phased 
in). An older workers (age 60 to 64) would have his pension wealth reduced by one 
third. These reductions are due to both the tighter eligibility conditions for early retire-
ment and the reduced generosity of the pension benefits. 
One way to evaluate the reforms is to aggregate the age-year values of the social se-
curity wealth one obtains to create an yearly index of the incentives faced by different 
cohorts in each particular year. Brugiavini and Peracchi (2007) make use of two incen-
tive measures, both are weighted averages: the first one called W  is the weighted sum 
of SSW using the labour force participation rates in each year-age cell as weights; the 
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value over the life-cycle (the peak value), again using the labour force participation 
rates as weights. The index  I  thus combines the wealth effect (yielding incentives to 
retire early) generated by the social security wealth and the dynamic gains from waiting 
to retire.  
Age distribution of Gross Social Security Wealth: Dini Regime versus Baseline. 
Cohorts Born 1938-1939-1940 
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Figure 4.2  
In Brugiavini and Peracchi (2007) both indexes W  and I  are computed on the basis 
of data relating to the median worker derived from the SHIW Survey. Figure 4.3 shows 
the evolution of the mean I -index (taking means over genders and ages). The rapid in-
crease from 1975 onward is due both to a larger number of the included cohorts be-
coming eligible for social security and to the increasing generosity of the system. After 
1990 the onset of the reforms reduced significantly the incentive to retire. 
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Figure 4.3 Mean values of the I-index over time 
The incentive variable I  is used by Brugiavini and Peracchi as an explanatory varia-
ble in regressions explaining the decision to retire. Results are summarized in Table 4.2 
in the Appendix, the incentive variable has the expected sign and it is significant when 
controlling for a number of relevant characteristics: hence the authors conclude that re-
forms have indeed been relevant for the labour supply decision of individuals on the 
verge of retirement.  
4.2  Effects of the labour market reforms 
As shown in Section 2, Italy spends just 0.5–1.5% of GDP for unemployment insurance, 
which is very low compared with the other countries. Furthermore I highlighted the 
characteristics of UI in Italy, which is limited to a relatively small number of workers 
and, though originating from an extremely generous system, is now paying quite low 
replacement rates.  
There are few “clean experiments” which can be used to study the effects of unem-
ployment insurance in Italy. In any case, before addressing that issue it is important to 
discuss what impact the labour market reforms of he 1990s had on labour market out-
comes. 
Underneath the broad time-series picture, Italy features a complex structure of disag-
gregated unemployment rates. The evidence presented in Section 2 shows that the Ital-
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differential, an age differential and a gender differential. 
Over time, the percentage of prime-age unemployed is decreasing, but the percentage 
of young unemployed individuals increases both for men and for women (women are 
characterized by higher unemployment rates at all ages). One important strand of the 
empirical literature in Italy has addressed the problem of high unemployment rates, par-
ticularly youth unemployment in Southern Italy.  
In order to explain the peculiarity of the Italian labour market some authors have re-
sorted to the issue of mismatch. In particular, these authors explored the hypothesis that 
the unbalanced evolution of labour demand and supply across different  geographical 
areas, i.e. regional mismatch, is partly responsible for the increase in aggregate and 
youth unemployment, in particularly in the Southern regions (Manacorda and Petron-
golo, 2005). According to this view, the determinants of the regional unemployment dif-
ferential can be seen in the following elements: labor force mobility from the Southern 
to the Northern Central areas has declined with the reduction of earnings differentials 
and with the increase in social transfers per head; real wages in the South are not af-
fected by local unemployment conditions but depend on the unemployment rate pre-
vailing in the leading areas, i.e. Northern countries. In other words, despite the increas-
ing unemployment in the South, labor mobility from South to the North has remained 
low and relative wages have not adjusted to reflect worsened local labor market condi-
tions. This has happened because the North-Central areas of the country have acted as a 
leading region in wage settlements. As a result, regional differences have widened.  
Together with regional mismatch and the lack of geographical mobility, skill mis-
match plays a role on determining high unemployment rate for the young in Italy. Some 
authors (see Caroleo and Pastore 2001) underline the fact that new entrants into the la-
bor market are more highly educated but the educational mix has not evolved in a simi-
lar way as far as demand for labour is concerned. Hence, the increasing level of school 
participation has not only delayed the entrance of the young in the labor market but has 
created a mismatch between the skills offered by the young entering in the labor market 
and the skills demanded by the firm.  
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explained by first-job seekers. The strong protecting role of the family has contributed 
to the low mobility patterns of young job seekers (in Italy people stay with their parents 
well beyond their 20’s, especially in the South). Moreover, in particular in the South, 
the public sector has represented for long time the only way to have a “regular” job and 
young people have built their own human capital and their own aspirations on this type 
of job, hence making it more difficult to move to Northern regions.  
A very popular explanation of youth unemployment is the rigidity of the Italian la-
bour market. The institutional feature which is mainly considered is Employment Pro-
tection Legislation (EPL)
19. One of the main empirical regularities is that EPL modifies 
the composition of employment: countries, like Italy, with stricter EPL have higher 
youth unemployment. Figure 4.4 shows the relationship between EPL and youth unem-



















































Figure 4.4 EPL and youth unemployment rate in Europe (2001), OECD 2004 
The “young-in-old-out” paradigm seems to have prevailed in Italy between 1985 and 
1990, as a result of incentives for firms to hire younger workers and the possibility to 
retire at very young ages (before age 55) with basically no actuarial penalty on the bene-
                                                 
19 See, for example, Bertola and Garibaldi (2002). 
40  IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy fit payments. However, the overall effect on total labour force participation was basi-
cally close to zero as the inflow of workers balanced out with the outflow into retire-
ment (Contini, 2005). Thus, the substitutability between workers of different age groups 
seems just temporary. 
The effects of labour market reforms such as the ”Treu package” of 1997 are contro-
versial: Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) refer to the outcome as a “two-tier labour market”. 
The authors theoretically argue that a transition into such a setting should induce a per-
manent reduction in the share of firms not adjusting employment levels. They validate 
their model using matched employer-employee Italian data referring to the 6 years pe-
riod around the introduction of the Treu package. Moreover, using standard survey data, 
they document a temporary positive effect on average employment (the “honeymoon ef-
fect” of the reform), as well as a negative association with average productivity. Leom-
bruni (2008) finds a significant increase in the probability of finding a job for individu-
als coming from the pool of unemployed as well as increased wage mobility associated 
with the reduction of employment protection 
Sciulli (2006) finds that controlling for personal characteristics, job duration and 
number of previous atypical experiences the introduction of the Treu Law increases the 
transitions towards an atypical job, both starting from an atypical contract and an out-
of-work state. Bison, Rettore and Schiozzerotto (2009), analyzing the effect of the afore 
mentioned reform on the labour market career of new entrants show that while the re-
form had a major positive impact on the probability of being hired on a temporary basis 
at the first employment spell, the proportion of individuals attaining a stable occupation 
three years after their entrance into the labour market is slightly lower after the reform 
than before it. Ichino, Mealli and Nannicini (2005) focus on Temporary Work Agencies 
(TWA), a feature introduced with the Treu reform: they find that being employed by a 
TWA nearly doubles the chances of finding a permanent job within 18 months. Lodo-
vici and Semenza (2008), though acknowledging the positive effect of temporary jobs 
on permanent employment probability compared to the unemployed, underline the gro-
wing risk of being trapped in temporary jobs by the weaker workers, namely women 
and workers in Southern Italy. Their conclusion is that the labour market reforms adop-
ted in Italy in recent years reinforced its segmentation and inequalities.  On the other 
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reduction in inequalities associated with the diffusion of temporary employment. For in-
stance, the share of women transiting to a “satisfactory job” one year after being tempo-
rary employed is higher than the corresponding share of men, and the same is true for 
other “weak” worker categories.  
Evidence on the effects of unemployment benefits on labour market outcomes is 
scarce in Italy. The most interesting recent paper is by Rosolia and Sestito (2009) who 
look at the changes in UI of 2001.  
The changes of 2001 involved (i) an increase in the replacement rate from 30% to 
40% and (ii) an extension from 6 months to 9 months of benefit payment only for work-
ers 50 and over. 
Rosolia and Sestito (2009) run regressions exploiting the policy changes as “natural 
experiments”. The sample period is restricted to the years 1998 to 2002. For illustrative 
purposes, I focus here on the extension of benefit duration. The regressions run are of 
the type:  
dit = θEit + Xitβ + uit 
dit: individual i’s completed time on benefits for a spell beginning in year t 
Eit: dummy for exposure to change 
Xit: individual and aggregate controls 
The interesting estimates pertain to the effect of potential duration (E = 1 if t ≥2001 
and age≥51). The identification of this effect relies on the comparison over time for pe-
ople of the same age groups. The two changes (i) and (ii) took place at the same time, 
but while younger workers were only affected by a higher replacement rate, older wor-
kers could also benefit from a longer potential duration, hence the 50+ are regarded as 
the “treatment group”. The main finding is that benefits spells increased significantly 
(by 20-30 days) for the population entitled to 90 additional days of benefits (the 50+) 
after the 2000. Benefit spells did not change significantly for the population entitled 
only to a higher replacement rate. In terms of take-up rates, the increase in take-up in 
2001 is likely to reflect the reform but the authors cannot rule out macroeconomic con-
ditions.  
42  IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy 4.3  The effects of changes in income tax rates 
Finally, very little work has been done on the effects of the tax rates (and their changes) 
on labour supply. The only convincing evidence is a paper by Colombino and Del Boca 
(1989) who model the tax rates in Italy for the year 1979, when as many as 32 different 
tax rates existed. They estimate a standard labour supply function for married men and 
women on SHIW data and find that married women labour supply is elastic to changes 
in wages and other incomes, while men’s labour supply is inelastic. Indeed a recent 
proposal by Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis (2009)  suggests that lower tax rates 
should be applied to women, particularly in Italy.  
5  Conclusions 
Italy has experienced important social security reforms in the 1990s and important la-
bour market reforms. The social security reforms aimed at reducing fiscal imbalances 
and restricting eligibility to early retirement, which was widespread and very generous. 
I show that these reforms had some effect on the reduction of early retirement take-ups, 
particularly through the age-eligibility restrictions on workers aged 50 to 55. However 
the important reform of 1995, which introduced a notional defined contribution (NDC) 
system has a long transitional period and will be fully phased in after 2032, when work-
ers will retire completely under the new rules (currently workers retire under a “pro 
rata” system which is a mixture of the old and new regime). Hence, although the new 
NDC system will be much less generous, it did not bring the desired budget saving ef-
fects because of the long transition. Also the effects on participation (keeping people in 
the labour force)  are still of moderate relevance.  Many authors would argue that in fact 
the effects of these reforms will come too late, once the game is over.  
Currently the debate on social security is on the necessary actuarial adjustments to 
make the system sustainable. In fact, even within the new NDC system the updates of 
the parameters which govern the actual benefit payment, explicitly envisaged by the 
law, have not been implemented. The aim of these actuarial “coefficients” was to insu-
late the pension system from increasing life expectancy, by reducing benefits automati-
cally as life expectancy increased. But this supposed automatic process has been slo-
wed. The coefficients should have been reviewed after the first ten years of the opera-
IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy  43 tion of the new system (1995-2005). Life expectancy in Italy, as in other countries, con-
tinued to grow in this period and the postponement of the introduction of new coeffici-
ents has had a negative impact on the finances of the system.  
The other issue which is currently debated is the most needed increase in the legal 
retirement age as well as further restrictions to early retirement. In fact, there have re-
cently been yet more delays in introducing increases in the minimum retirement age.  
The Italian labour market has long been characterized (and still is) by lack of flex-
ibility, this is well documented by the Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) in-
dexes where Italy has scored very high for a long time. In order to reduce the rigidities 
of the market, two important laws were passed in 1997 and 2003, which regulated short-
term contracts. The laws made it possible for firms to hire without having to transform 
the short-term contract into an open-ended one. This has somewhat eased the EPL index 
in this segment of the labour market. But as a consequence of the reforms, workers on 
short-term contracts lack welfare protection.  
The unemployment insurance system is limited to workers who lose their jobs 
through provisions such as ordinary (or special) UI or as a wage supplement (CIG). 
Both these schemes cover the work force typically engaged in open-ended contracts and 
only a fraction of fixed-term contracts.  The empirical evidence shows that raising the 
level and duration of UI had some minor impact (and only on older workers), presu-
mably as a bridge to retirement, hence the concern on the negative incentive on work of 
these UI benefits should be of a second order importance if compared with the welfare 
gains to workers.  
In Italy, there is no centrally governed system of poverty alleviation, as this is re-
sponsibility of local governments. The problem is particularly acute for the young and 
unemployed, who have very little protection. Only a few experiments have been carried 
out in parts of Italy which introduce a non- contributory minimum income, specifically 
for the young (reddito di inserimento), but the conditions of the experiment have made 
it very hard to carry out a proper evaluation exercise. 
One main conclusion of this report is that in Italy public old age spending crowds out 
other social expenditures in social policy such as benefits for children or unemploy-
ment. The second most striking evidence is that the UI system is still segmented and in 
44  IFAU – Welfare reforms and labour supply in Italy any case restricted to people who lost their jobs in the form of open-ended contracts.  
Hence the most serious challenges for the Italian welfare system are related to the wel-
fare of workers, of the out of work people (especially young) and families with children.  
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Figure A.1 Self-reported activity in percentage of individuals in the age group 50–54 
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Figure A.2 Self-reported activity in percentage of individuals in the age group 55–59 
Source: Bank of Italy Survey SHIW 
 















1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005
Year
Unempl age 50-54 (77-03) 1 nempr
Italy 1977-2003
Unemployment and nonemployment rate of old (50-54)
 
Figure A.3 Unemployment rates versus non-employment rates for the age group 50-54 
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Figure A.4 Unemployment rates versus non-employment for the age group 20-24 
(Source: Labour Force Survey) 
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Table A.1 Regression results for the retirement decision 
 
TABLE 3:  
Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Incentive measure -0.018 ** 0.002 -0.024 ** 0.002 0.041 ** 0.005
ssw -0.117 ** 0.013 -0.128 ** 0.013 -0.102 ** 0.013
sex 0.137 ** 0.006 0.137 ** 0.005 0.072 ** 0.007
public sector -0.023 ** 0.011 -0.022 0.011 0.185 ** 0.014
self-employed -0.177 ** 0.007 -0.175 ** 0.007 -0.174 ** 0.010
low edu 0.463 ** 0.045 0.459 ** 0.045 1.001 ** 0.061
sec edu   0.338 ** 0.047 0.335 ** 0.047 0.277 ** 0.064
south -0.053 ** 0.025 -0.054 ** 0.025 -0.098 ** 0.036
age dummies vvv
year dummies vvv
_cons 0.558 ** 0.048 0.570 ** 0.048 -0.060 0.064
N 2226 2226 2784
R-squared   0.8408 0.8418 0.7563
Notes: N=number of observations. ** Significant at the 5 percent level
Dependent variable is a measure of retired at that age in that year (50-75 years old)
Incentive measure is the Option Value (OV), the Peak Value (PV) and the Implicit Tax (IT)
OV PV IT
RETIREMENT DECISIONS AS A FUNCTION OF INCENTIVES
Source Brugiavini-Peracchi, 2007 
Note: dependent variable is a dummy taking value 1 if the individual is retired and 0 if he is working 
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